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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
James Rhoads was convicted, following a jury trial, of felony DUI and felony
operating a vehicle without the owner's consent (hereinafter, joyriding).

Mr. Rhoads

asserts that the district court erred in allowing a witness to testify to a hearsay statement
as an "excited utterance."

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On the evening of April 10, 2011, Ada County Dispatch received a 911 call
reporting that a vehicle had slid off Bogus Basin Road in Ada County around mile post
7. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) Deputy Shannon Miller
arrived at the scene and observed two individuals, a man and a woman, who had been
in a one-car accident.

(Trial Tr., p.245, L.1, p.247, Ls.11-24.)

The car was badly

damaged 1 and on the edge of a cliff midway up Bogus Basin Road. (Trial Tr., p.246,
Ls.9-15, p.247, Ls.14-20.) Both Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads were muddy and dressed
inappropriately for the cold April weather. (Trial Tr., p.245, Ls.21-23, p.247, Ls.10-11,
p.259, L13 - p.260, L.1.) Both Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads appeared intoxicated and
Mr. Rhoads was not wearing shoes. (Trial Tr., p.245, L.23, p.259, Ls.5-15, p.315, Ls.35.) The two individuals told the officers at the accident scene that a man named "Jeff"
had been driving, but he ran away after he wrecked the car. (Trial Tr., p.246, Ls.1-3,
p.253, Ls.8-18, p.260, Ls.17-25; PSI, p.2.)

1

The car belonged to Sherry Kreisher,

Damage to the car included barbed wire scratches, mud, and a large crack in the top
corner of the windshield on the passenger's side. (Trial Tr., p.188, Ls.18-20, p.247,
Ls.19-24.)
1

Ms. Holland's girlfriend at the time. (Trial Tr., p.117, L.25 - p.118, L.3, p.139, L.24 p.140, L.1, p.169, L.24-p.170, L.4.)
Earlier that day, Ms. Kreisher had driven Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads to the
grocery store and bought a gallon of wine. (Trial Tr., p.121, Ls.6-20, p.142, Ls.18-19.)
Ms. Kreisher then drove them back to her apartment, where the three proceeded to
drinkthewinetogether. 2 (Trial Tr., p.121, Ls.21-22, p.141, Ls.11-25.) Ms. Kreisher and
Ms. Holland laid down on the couch to watch a movie, and Mr. Rhoads left the
apartment for a period of time. (Trial Tr., p.122, Ls.9-10, p.122, L.20 - p.123, L.5.) A
short time after Mr. Rhoads returned to the apartment, Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads
grabbed the bottle of wine and went out the front door, presumably towards the patio.
(Trial Tr., p.125, Ls.5-8.) It was some time later that Ms. Kreisher realized that her car
was missing.

(Trial Tr., p.125, Ls.17-25.)

The keys had been on her purse, in the

bedroom she had shared with Ms. Holland. (Trial Tr., p.126, Ls.18-23, p.140, Ls.5-7,
p.194, L.25 - p.195, L.6.) Ms. Kreisher did not see either Ms. Holland or Mr. Rhoads
take her keys, and did not see anyone driving her car.

(Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.3-8.)

Ms. Holland had previously driven the car with Ms. Kreisher's permission.

(Trial

Tr., p.140, Ls.8-15., p.153, L.24-p.154, L.11, p.197, Ls.1-2.)
Pictures of the vehicle's interior after the accident reflected that the driver's seat
was positioned close to the steering wheel. (Defense Ex., C.) The pictures depicted
the passenger's seat as pushed nearly as far back as it could go. 3 (Defense Ex., C.) A
pair of large shoes was located on the passenger-side floor. (Defense Ex., D.) A pair of

Ms. Holland was only 20 years old at the time, and was arrested that night for illegal
consumption. (Trial Tr., p.199, L.23 - p.200, L.6, p.320, Ls.17-19.)
3 Mr. Rhoads is a tall man, approximately six feet tall. (Trial Tr., p.314, L.22 - p.315,
L.2, 338, Ls.1-2.) Ms. Holland is a petite woman at approximately five feet, five inches,
130 pounds. (Trial Tr., p.204, Ls.11-14, 337, Ls.24-25.)
2

2

sunglasses identified by Ms. Kreisher as belonging to Mr. Rhoads was located in the
driver's side door compartment. (Trial Tr., p.135 Ls.11-25.)
Ms. Holland initially told Deputies Miller and Hale that "Jeff" was driving and she
was riding in the backseat when the accident happened. 4

(Trial Tr., p.253, Ls.8-10,

p.300, Ls.3-4.) She told the nurse at her physician's appointment three days after the
accident that she didn't remember anything at all from that day. (Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.1119.)

In the same visit, she told her physician that the impact was in the front of the

vehicle and that she was wearing a seatbelt. (Trial Tr., p.287, L.8 - p.288, L.2.) Then
she testified at Mr. Rhoads' preliminary hearing that she remembered nothing about the
entire day. (Trial Tr., p.195, Ls.7-22.) Ms. Holland said that she possibly was driving
when they first left Ms. Kreisher's house, but she didn't remember.
Ls.17-25, p.197, Ls.10-14.)

(Trial Tr., p.196,

At Mr. Rhoads' trial, Ms. Holland testified that she

remembered only bits and pieces of that day. (Trial Tr. p.184, Ls.4-13.) She recalled
looking for her cigarettes at one point, and at that time Mr. Rhoads was driving. (Trial
Tr. p.184, L.14 - p.185, L.8.) The next thing she remembered was trying to crawl out of
the passenger door. 5 (Trial Tr., p.186, Ls.1-4.)
Mr. Rhoads consistently maintained that "Jeff" was driving the car.
Tr., p.253, Ls.16-18, p.260, Ls.22-25, p.312, Ls.9-16.)
each time she was questioned and/or testified. 6

(Trial

Ms. Holland's stories varied

(PSI, p.2; Trial Tr., p.184, Ls.4-13,

p.195, Ls.7-22, p.196, Ls.17-25, p.197, Ls.10-14, p.253, Ls.8-10, p.300, Ls.3-4.)

Although Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads initially claimed a person named "Jeff" was
driving and that "Jeff' fled the scene, Ms. Holland later admitted that "Jeff" was a
fictitious person. (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.7-21.)
5 The driver's side door was not a valid method of exiting the vehicle, as it was up
against the barbed wire fence and was hanging over the cliff. (State's Ex. 1.)
4

3

Mr. Rhoads had one previous felony DUI conviction, from a 2006 case.

(Trial

Tr., p.442, Ls.23-25.) Ms. Holland had two prior misdemeanor DUI convictions, one in
2009 and one in 2011. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Rhoads was charged by information with felony DUI, felony joyriding, and
failure to report an accident. (R., pp.40-41.)
At the jury trial in this case, the State presented the testimony of Deputy Miller
and Detective Hales of the Ada County Sheriff's Department.

(Trial Tr., p.242, L.6 -

p.267, L.19, p.292, L.6 - p.335, L.20) Deputy Miller was the first officer to arrive at the
scene. She immediately placed the two individuals in the back of her car, as they were
dressed inappropriately for the weather.

(Trial Tr., p.245, Ls.22-23, p.247, Ls.9-11.)

Deputy Miller then transported the individuals back to the crash site. (Trial Tr., p.246,
Ls.9-15.) Ms. Holland complained of an injury to her knee. (Trial Tr., p.264, Ls.14-23.)
Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads sat in the back of Deputy Miller's car for approximately 40
minutes, during which time they conversed, 7 and even sang. 8 (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.5-23;
State's Ex., *-008.)

Deputy Miller's car video recorded the two's conversations and

antics. (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.5-23; State's Ex., *-008.)
Deputy Hales testified that he decided not to have the steering wheel of the car
tested for finger prints. (Trial Tr., p.331, Ls.6-15.) Although he asked Mr. Rhoads
whether his fingerprints would be on the steering wheel of the car and Mr. Rhoads
responded that they might be, on cross-examination, Deputy Hales acknowledged that

For example, Ms. Holland also misrepresented the facts when asked where she lived
(Trial Tr., p.260, Ls.6-16), when she lost her phone (Trial Tr., p.261, L.21 - p.262, L.3),
and whether she smoked or drank alcohol (Trial Tr., p.286, L.10 - p.287, L.13).
7 Some part of their conversation involved reiterating that Jeff was the driver of the car
and that he had left the scene. (State's Ex., *-008.)
8 Mr. Rhoads was in a band and presumably they were signing one of the songs his
band performed. (Trial Tr., p.118, Ls.4-12; State's Ex., *-008.)
6

4

there are several other ways by which Mr. Rhoads' fingerprints could have gotten on the
steering wheel other than by driving the car. (Trial Tr., p.331, L.16

p.333, L.3.)

In addition to these officers, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Benjamin
Cornett, who was an emergency room physician who Ms. Holland's visited three days
after the accident, purportedly regarding injuries she suffered in the accident. 9
Tr., p.280, L.2 - p.281, L.21.)

(Trial

Dr. Cornett testified that Ms. Holland reported that she

was in a motor vehicle collision and hit her head. (Trial Tr., p.281, Ls.13-19.)
Dr. Cornett testified that Ms. Holland complained of a dull throbbing frontal headache
and some nausea, and he determined that she likely had suffered a concussion. (Trial
Tr., p.281, L.16-p.282, L.15.)
Finally, the State presented the testimony of a witness who was traveling down
Bogus Basin Road and saw Mr. Rhoads and Ms. Holland standing on the side of the
road. (Trial Tr., p.336, L.24 - p.337, L.19.)

Over the objections of Mr. Rhoads'

attorney, the witness was permitted to testify that he heard Ms. Holland say to
Mr. Rhoads, "You wrecked [inaudible]'s car." (Trial Tr., p.341, L.22 - p.342, L.6.) The
district court found that this statement was an "excited utterance" and thus fell within an

Dr. Garnett's diagnosis of a concussion was based on information Ms. Holland
reported to him. (Trial Tr., p.276, Ls.22-24, p.284, Ls.5-17.) A CT scan came back
negative as did Dr. Garnett's tests of memory, reflexes, etc., so there was no physical
evidence to support Ms. Holland's complaints other than a moderate tenderness to her
forehead. (Trial Tr., p.284, L.25 - p.285, L.5.) Further, Ms. Holland told the nurse that
she did not remember the accident or anything from that day and complained of a
headache, shoulder pain and low back pain. (Trial Tr. p.285, Ls.11-19.) She told the
nurse that the vehicle may have just gone off the side of the road. (Trial Tr., p.288,
Ls.11-16.) However, at the same visit, she told Dr. Cornett many more details about the
accident-that she was wearing a seat belt, that the driver lost control of the vehicle,
that the impact was in the front of the vehicle, and that this was a single-vehicle
accident which resulted in mild damage to the vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.287, L.8 - p.288,
L.2.) Further, Ms. Holland offered additional inconsistent statements where she told the
nurse that she did smoke but did not use alcohol, but told Dr. Cornett that she uses
alcohol, but does not smoke. (Trial Tr., p.286, L.1 O- p.287, L.13.)
9

5

exception to the prohibition against hearsay contained in the rules of evidence, I.R.E.
803(2). (Trial Tr., p.342, L.18- p.343, L.7.)
After some discussion of whether Mr. Rhoads would testify, Mr. Rhoads advised
the district court that he would not be testifying, and the defense rested without
presenting any evidence. (Trial Tr., p.362, Ls.4-20, p.363, L.18-19.)
The jury convicted Mr. Rhoads of felony DUI and felony joyriding. (Trial
Tr., p.441, Ls.13-17; R., pp.158-161.)

Mr. Rhoads was acquitted on the charge of

misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. (Trial Tr., p.441, L.17.)
At trial, Mr. Rhoads stipulated that this was his second felony DUI in ten years.
(Trial Tr., p.442, L.23 - p.443, L.6.)
The district court ordered a PSI, a mental health evaluation, and a substance
abuse evaluation, and it set the matter for a sentencing hearing. (Trial Tr., p.446, L.24 p.27, L.5; 5/8/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.18-25; R., p.153.)
Mr. Rhoads was sentenced on March 8, 2012. (5/8/12 Tr., generally; R., p.33.)
At the time of sentencing, Mr. Rhoads was before the court in two cases-the instant
case as well as a 2006 case in which the State had alleged a probation violation.
(5/8/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-22.) The 2006 case, CR 2006-124, was a charge of felony DUI,
to which Mr. Rhoads pied guilty and received a withheld judgment.

(5/8/12 Tr., p.5,

Ls.13-22.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked for a sentence of ten years unified,
with five years fixed, on the felony DUI and five years indeterminate for the felony
joyriding conviction.

(5/8/12 Tr., p.27, Ls.13-16.)

Mr. Rhoads offered significant

evidence in mitigation (PSI, pp.254-281) and, during his allocution, expressed
considerable remorse for relapsing and for putting himself in the situation that he did
6

(5/8/12 Tr., p.41, Ls.1-5). Mr. Rhoads was sentenced to 10 years, with four years fixed,
for his conviction of felony DUI.

(5/8/12 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-4.) For his conviction of felony

joyriding, Mr. Rhoads received a sentence of five years, with four years fixed. (5/8/12
Tr., p.25, Ls.4-8.) Each of these sentences was ordered to run concurrently. (5/8/12
Tr., p.25, Ls.9-11; R., p.159.)

Mr. Rhoads timely appealed from his judgments of conviction and sentences.
(R., pp.164-166, 173-176.)

7

ISSUE

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting hearsay statements of a codefendant/accomplice where the remarks did not fall under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule?

8

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Cara Holland's Hearsay
Statement Through The Testimony Of A Third Party Because The Remark Did Not Fall
Under The Excited Utterance Exception To The Hearsay Rule

A.

Introduction
The district court erred in admitting Ms. Holland's alleged statement to

Mr. Rhoads regarding who wrecked the car, through the testimony of Mr. Guryan,
because the remarks occurred approximately 20-30 minutes after the accident, when
Mr. Guryan saw Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads walking up Bogus Basin Road, and the
car was not immediately in sight. Although the district court found the fact that both
Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads were covered in mud persuasive to establish the recency
of the accident, the presence of mud on one's clothing is not synonymous with a
specific length of time. Further, Ms. Holland and Mr. Roads were found some distance
from the vehicle and were described as acting calm, indicating both that they had been
walking up the road for quite some time and they had time to reflect on the accident.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Cara Holland's Hearsay
Statement Through The Testimony Of A Third Party Because The Remark Did
Not Fall Under The Excited Utterance Exception To The Hearsay Rule
During the testimony of Mr. Guryan, the State sought to introduce a statement

allegedly

made

by

Ms.

Holland

to

Mr.

Rhoads

as

they

approached

Mr. Guryan. Mr. Guryan overheard Ms. Holland say, "I can't believe you wrecked soand-so's car." Defense counsel objected (Trial Tr., p.355, Ls.18-20), but the district
court found that because Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads were still covered in mud, the
statement was "contemporaneous" with the accident (Trial Tr., p.356, Ls.7-13).
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence (I.R.E.) 802, hearsay is inadmissible except as
provided by the Rules of Evidence. The relevant hearsay exception is embodied in
9

I.R.E. 803(2). Pursuant to I.R.E. 803(2) a "statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition" may come in under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule. I.R.E. 803(2) (emphasis added). In order to fall within this exception, there must
be a startling event which renders inoperative the normal reflective thought process of
the observer, and the declarant's statement must be a spontaneous reaction to that

even rather than the result of reflective thought. State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 4 (1986);
State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 873, 876 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 325
(Ct. App. 1999).

In State v. Griffith, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted:
In considering whether a statement constitutes an excited utterance, the
totality of the circumstances must be considered, including the nature of
the startling condition or event, the amount of time that elapsed between
the event and the statement, the age and condition of the declarant, the
presence or absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was
volunteered or made in response to a question.
State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 362-63 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal citation omitted).

Further, whether to admit a statement as an excited utterance is committed to the trial
court's discretion, State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 421 (1989); Doe, 140 Idaho at 876,
and that decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Id.
at 877.
In State v. Burton, 115 Idaho 1154 (Ct. App. 1989), the Idaho Court of Appeals
held that the district court did not err in excluding evidence offered by defense counsel
under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule when there was a fiveminute interval between the end of the declarant/defendant's fight with the victims and
making the statements. Burton involved an altercation between the defendant, his son,
and the victims at a bar, and the defendant had shot the two victims with a pistol.
10

Id. at

1155. The defendant was charged with aggravated battery. Id. When the State called
the defendant's son as a witness at trial, he attempted to repeat to the jury a remark the
defendant had made to him as they drove away from the bar. Id. The defendant's son
attempted to say, '"I had to shoot them. They were going to rat-pack us. . . . I had to
do it for you."' Id.
inadmissible hearsay.
noted

that the

However, the district court determined that the statement was
Id. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Court of Appeals

"excited

utterance" exception

to

the

hearsay rule

"has two

requirements. First there must be a startling event which renders inoperative the
normal reflective thought processes of the observer. Second, the declarant's statement
must be a spontaneous reaction to that event rather than the result of reflective
thought." Id. at 1156. The appellate court stated that the district court found that the
second requirement had not been met, noting that: ( 1) the statement was detached by
time

and

distance

from

the

events;

and

(2)

the

statement

was

self-

serving. Id. Therefore, the circumstances did not point to any "'special reliability"' that
would entitle the defendant's statement to be admitted under I.R.E. 803(2). Id.
In State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323 (Ct. App. 1999), the Idaho Court of Appeals
held that the district court committed error in admitting the declarant/victim's remarks
through the testimony of a police officer, because the remarks were not "excited
utterances," when there was a ten-minute interval between the end of the declarant's
fight with the defendant and making the statements.

Hansen involved a confrontation

between the declarant and her boyfriend, and the declarant reported to the police that
the boyfriend pushed the declarant into her house, smashed furniture, repeatedly
pushed the declarant onto the couch, and kicked items out of her hands. Id. at

11

327. The boyfriend was charged with battery.

Id. at 324. The Court noted that in

determining whether a statement falls within the excited utterance exception:
[t]he circumstances to be considered include the amount of time that
elapsed between the startling event and the statement, the nature of the
condition or event, the age and condition of the declarant, the presence or
absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was volunteered or
made in response to a question.

Id. at 325. In vacating the Judgment of Conviction and remanding the case for a new
trial, the Court primarily reasoned that (1) the ten minute gap between the conclusion
of the delcarant's fight with the defendant and her arrival at the police station was
sufficient time for reflective thought and fabrication; (2) the declarant's anger with the
defendant could have provided an incentive to concoct or embellish her description of
the confrontation to the police officer; (3) the statements were not an expletive or burst
of words in abrupt response to a shocking event, but an extensive narration of the fight;
and (4) the declarant was not a child, but rather an adult woman. Id. at 326-27.
Therefore, the statements did not carry the indicia of reliability envisioned by I.R.E.
· 803(2). Id. at 326.

Over the objections of Mr. Rhoads' attorney, witness Michael Guryan was
permitted to testify that he overheard Ms. Holland say to Mr. Rhoads, "I can't believe
you wrecked [inaudible]'s car." (Trial Tr., p.341, L.22 - p.342, L.6.) Defense counsel
objected to the statement coming in as an excited utterance because:

(1) it was a

statement by a potential co-defendant; and (2) the statement was not contemporaneous
to when the incident happened. (Trial Tr., p.355, L.17 - p.356, L.4.) The district court
found that this statement was an "excited utterance" and thus fell within an exception to
the hearsay rules.

(Trial Tr., p.355, Ls.3-7.)

reasoning:
12

The district court further explained its

And the Court will note that one of the things that I paid particular attention
to is the fact that the parties were still muddy from coming up the hill, and
that is one of the reasons that I made the determination that this had
occurred, and the parties were still under the influence of the event.
(Trial Tr., p.356, Ls.7-13.).
However, between the time of the accident and the time Mr. Guryan overheard
Ms. Holland's statement about wrecking the car, Ms. Holland had climbed out of the car,
perhaps made some attempts to free the car, scrambled up a muddy embankment, and
began walking/staggering down the road. (Trial Tr., p.262, L.20

p.263, L.10, p.337,

Ls.15-22, p.346, Ls.16-19, p.348, Ls.3-7.) Thus the statement was detached both by
time and by distance from the accident.

Mr. Guryan, the witness who was traveling

down Bogus Basin Road and saw Mr. Rhoads and Ms. Holland walking on the side of
the road, testified that he did not initially see the car:
In fact, what was odd was that there was no car to be seen when we came
down the hill and around the corner. We just saw two people.
(Trial Tr., p.346, Ls.13-19.) Mr. Guryan testified that he couldn't tell if they were arguing
or struggling to hold each other up, and described it as a "weird dance."

(Trial

Tr., p.339, Ls.9-11, p.348, L.23.) Mr. Guryan said that the two individuals had one shoe
between them-like they had lost some shoes trying to get up the embankment. (Trial
Tr., p.348, Ls.3-7.) Further, Mr. Guryan's description of the situation made it clear that
he was not witnessing some sort of emergency-although the two individuals were
missing some shoes and were quite muddy, they "popped back up and said, 'Oh, we
are fine. Everything is good."' (Trial Tr., p.337, L.20 - p.339, L.14.)
Thus Ms. Holland's statement was sufficiently separated in both time and
location from the accident such that it was not contemporaneous.

13

Further, the statement made by Ms. Holland was self-serving. See Burton, 115
Idaho at 1156. The district court failed to consider that the statement was made by one
of only two people in the car who could have been driving.

The statement by

Ms. Holland was most decidedly self-serving. Ms. Holland, a minor under the age of 21,

was certainly under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident, and, had she
admitted to driving the car, it was very likely she would have then been charged with
felony driving under the influence. 10 A comment as to who was driving in front of the
first witness they encountered was a self-serving statement by Ms. Holland, and
therefore should not fall under the "excited utterance" hearsay exception.
As Ms. Kreisher's car was found "on an edge of a cliff," held up only by a barbed
wire fence (Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.14-18, p.252, Ls.9-12), such qualified as a startling event
which may have, for a period of time during and immediately following the accident,
rendered inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of those inside the vehicle
during the accident. However, Ms. Holland's statement was not a spontaneous reaction
to the accident, but was the result of reflective thought.

Here, like the statement in

Hansen, Ms. Holland had sufficient time after the accident for reflective thought and
fabrication. Notably, Ms. Holland had, in fact, constructed a story with Mr. Rhoads that
identified a fictitious person named "Jeff" as the driver of the car. (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.721.)

Since Ms. Holland had ample time to reflect and discuss the fabrication of a

fictitious driver, accordingly she also had sufficient time to reflect on the accident such
that the statement was clearly not an "excited utterance." The circumstances in this

10

As Ms. Holland had two prior misdemeanor DUls in the last ten years, she was facing
felony charges if she was implicated as the driver of the vehicle. (PSI, p.3.) In fact,
Ms. Holland could have still been charged with a felony DUI as of the date of her
testimony at Mr. Rhoads' trial. (Trial Tr., p.266, Ls.1-7.)
14

case do not indicate any '"special reliability'" about Ms. Holland's statement such that it
would be admissible under LR

803(2)<

Consequently, the district court erred in admitting the statement as an "excited
utterance," and Mr. Rhoads respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of
conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Rhoads respectfully requests that this Court

vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new
tria I.
DATED this 1ih day of April, 2013<
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